Весьма жаль. Но вот, что есть у меня(данные с одного форума):
"Я уже говорил, что до прихода власти ВТР Оспан уже стал главой самопровозглашенного правительства в Алтайском округе. В это же время он меняет тактику "лишения рыбы от воды" на тактику нападения на основные базы Гоминьдана и уезды округа. Прежние четыре повстанческих отряда увеличились до девяти (их личный состав достиг 2200 человек). Из МНР в это время[конец 1944 г.] вновь пришла помощь: 350 винтовок, 100 автоматов, 20 тяжелых пулеметов, 30 легких пулеметов, 6 минометов, 2 противотанковых оружия, 100 ящиков гранат, 500 ящиков боеприпасов."
А с китайской и казахской? Вот как описан Бейдахшанский инцидент в книге Линды Бенсон
"Ili rebellion…" рр. 122-125,
The Beidashan Incident
At the same time as the central authorities were showing a certain disregard for local susceptibilities in Xinjiang, an incident occurred on the Sino-Mongolian border that showed clearly the Chinese government's view that the solutions to the province's problems lay either in the international sphere or in the realm of standard pacificatory measures. To understand this it is necessary to look first at the sequence of events unraveling in northern and northeastern Xinjiang early in 1947.
Osman Batur, an important leader of the Kerei Kazaks, had originally allied himself with the ETR, but as early as the summer of 1946 he was in contact with the Chinese government, from which he hoped to receive arms in order to continue what he called his fight against communism.
Given the legend and myth that now surround Osman, it is difficult to establish his true motives in shifting allegiance from the ETR to the Guomindang—whether it was Soviet interference in the ETR, as he claimed, or the fact that he may simply have been an independent agent, involved in the Altai fighting for whatever advantage it would bring him and his followers. What is known is that Osman was one of several Kazak leaders who in 1946-47 began activities against the ETR in the three districts, and who received military and other aid from the Nationalist Chinese.
Chinese sources claim that Osman wrote to General Song Xilian in July 1946 offering to join the Nationalists in fighting communism. Upon hearing of his appointment as a "government official" on August 15, 1946, he was overcome with emotion and from that time on was committed to the Nationalist cause.75
There is no indication that Nationalist military aid was given to Osman at this time, nor did he undertake any military action against Ili. He remained in the Altai District capital of Chenghua until November 1946.76
In July 1946 another important Kazak leader, Ali Beg Hakim, had sent his representative to Urumqi to see Janimhan and Salis, the two Kazak members of the newly formed coalition government. The representative told the Nationalist government that All Beg Hakim and his people would resist Ili and cooperate with the Nationalists. As part of his resistance movement against Ili, Ali Beg wrote literature for distribution among Altai Kazaks and elsewhere in Xinjiang, and he may have been the source of handbills that appeared in Urumqi in the winter of 1946-47.77
After leaving Chenghua in November 1946, Osman's forces took part in at least one battle with the Ili forces on March 27, 1947,78 and again on April 7, 1947, after which they withdrew from Gexiubao (Kurte) to Beidashan on the border between Xinjiang and Mongolia.79
Complaints against Osman by the local people quickly surfaced. Burhan, the second vice-chairman of the province at the time, was sent on an inspection mission to the Altai in April 1947, accompanied by an Ili faction representative, Rahim Jan. At a meeting with people's representatives in the Altai on April 4, 1947, Osman was accused of stealing sheep and other animals, and demands were made for his arrest and punishment. Burhan reported on Osman directly to Chairman Zhang, but no action was taken, because no one could go against General Song.80
Osman was joined at Beidashan by more Kazaks, so that by June and July he was leading some 1,200 families. Osman had not been able to bring adequate supplies with him, and it was reported that the Chinese were sup-plying him with sheep and flour.81
In May, the Mongolian government reported that a division of three hundred Han and Kazak troops had illegally entered Mongolian territory at Baytak Bogda, the Turki name for Beidashan, and had arrested and taken away some Mongol soldiers 82 The border in this area has been called "unclear."83 Nonetheless, there were border posts in the area held by the Nationalists on one side and Mongols on the other, so that, although the actual border line itself was unclear, the soldiers in the area were aware of the approximate extent—if not the exact perimeter—of their own territory.
When Osman withdrew into this area from central Altai, he was camping on lands that traditionally had been summer grazing pastures used by both Kazaks from Xinjiang and Mongols from the MPR.84 Osman's camp (according to most of the accounts cited below) was near that of Nationalist border guards stationed in the Beidashan area.
When the Xinjiang provincial government did not reply to Mongol demands85 that the arrested soldiers be returned (it was, after all, a time of crisis for the coalition, due to Mesut's appointment), the Mongolians issued an ultimatum. After forty-eight hours had expired, they sent four planes on June 5 to bomb the Chinese border guard's post at Beidashan. Bombing continued on June 6, 7, and 8; two Chinese were reportedly killed in the raids.86
In explaining the attack on the border post, the Chinese held that the incident initially began as an attack on Osman, who had angered the Soviet Union and its MPR ally by rejecting the ETR and choosing to fight against it. Some Turki sources support this, as they record that Osman had been approached by representatives of both the USSR and the ETR during the winter of 1946-47. Osman, having twice rebuffed overtures from the Soviets, then became the object of attacks by Colonel Leskin, a Soviet-trained officer serving with the ETR army. According to Kazak accounts, Leskin had followed Osman from Altai to Beidashan, where he finally orchestrated the at-tack that led to the incident.87
First reactions to the border clashes were guarded. The U.S. consul noted the delay in the Chinese announcement of the border violation. It was on June 11, 1947, that the Chinese Information Office first told foreign correspondents of the incidents, and they then simply said that Soviet planes had bombed Beidashan. They declined to give further details.88
Indeed, the Chinese themselves at first seemed unsure of the actual location of Beidashan. One government report placed it 117 miles northeast of the town of Qitai, putting it right on the Sino-Mongolian border, but another report said the Mongolians had penetrated two hundred miles into Xinjiang to attack Beidashan.89
On June 10, the Chinese lodged an official protest with both the Soviet Union and the MPR government, demanding immediate withdrawal of Mongolian troops from Chinese territory. The protest declared that Beidashan was garrisoned by loyal Han and Kazak troops, and that Soviet action had been aimed at intimidating the Kazaks into becoming pro-Soviet."
The official Mongolian statement, issued on June 15, declared that on June 5 Chinese troops had entered the MPR and proceeded 15 kilometers to Baytak Bogda (Beidashan), where they camped and then assaulted Mongolian border guards. In reply, the MPR troops had driven the Chinese out—after the Chinese had refused a Mongolian officer's request for them to leave peacefully. Attacked with the aid of planes of the MPR air force, the Chinese had been driven back across the border, which was at no time crossed by the Mongolians. No mention of any Kazaks is made in the MPR report.91 Thereafter the incident petered out into an exchange of mutual accusations of border infringement by both the Chinese and the Mongols.
Regardless of what actually happened at Beidashan that June, the incident clearly established, first, that Chinese authorities were in direct contact with Osman and were supplying him with food and other materials. They were thus aiding a group that was in direct conflict with the Ili forces while at the same time participating with those same forces in the coalition government, which aimed at peace and stability in Xinjiang.
Second, the incident showed the basic conviction of the Chinese government that its problems in Xinjiang lay with the government of the USSR, and the government's willingness to capitalize on any incident that might at-tract international support to the Nationalist cause in its differences with the USSR and the MPR. It had the additional advantage of drawing attention away from the increasingly chaotic economic and political situation in China proper.92
Once again, the Chinese interpretation of Xinjiang's troubles officially placed the blame on Soviet intrigue, the Chinese version of the Beidashan incident reflecting a basic political stand. Even before the Chinese them-selves had been able to verify the details of the "attack"—or even to establish where the incident took place—the Chinese government had blamed the USSR and its MPR ally. Once the incident had been milked of all propaganda value, it was dropped from the news"
75 The title he was given was guanshi, meaning simply government official. Zhang, Seventy Years, 12:7306. According to Zhang, Osman made five points in his letter to the Chinese military: He would uphold the Three Principles of the People in the Ashan district; protect lives of all the people; strike and drive out any Mongols in the Beidashan area; and defend the country; finally, he requested that the government supply him with ammunition. As a source for this information, Zhang cites "Xinjiang Garrison Command Classified Information on Ili Military Developments, Report No. 91," July 20, 1946. Zhang also cites a letter from Osman to Chairman Zhang in a similar military report dated July 25, 1946, no. 95, in which Osman claims that he and
his people were cheated into joining the Ili forces and asks that the government extend its protection to him and his people. See Zhang, Seventy Years, 12:7306-7307.
76 Hasan Oraltay, Kazak Turkleri, p. 102.
77 Ibid. U.S. sources (which refer to All Beg Hakim as "Halibek") say he became pro-Chinese in early 1947. FRUS, 1947, p. 580.
78. Ibid. No specific date is given.
79 FRUS, 1947, p. 568.
80 Burhan, Fifty Years, p. 316. As a member of the CCP and representative of the government that had Osman executed in 1951, it could be expected that Burhan would include criticism of Osman in his memoirs. However, as noted previously, there were many regular complaints about the man and his followers whenever they shifted their center of operations.
81 FRUS, 1947, p. 568. This information is the result of the personal visit of a U.S. consular official to the Beidashan area in June 1947.
82 The number of soldiers taken varies from source to source. Zhang Dajun says two. See Zhang Dajun, Sishi nian dongluan Xinjiang (Hong Kong: Yazhou chubanse, 1956), p. 219. An American source says eight. See FRUS, 1947, p. 557.
83 Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 101.
84 Ibid., p. 100. Curiously, Lattimore makes little comment on the Beidashan affair, saying only that the whole business (which he does not describe) was sensationalized by the press
85 Song said that he had, in fact, sent an order to release the Mongol prisoners, but it had not arrived in time. FRUS, 1947, p. 557.
86 Ibid., p. 557.
87 See especially Halife Altay, Anayurttan Anadolu ))a (Ankara: Modern Matbaa, 1981), p. 448. Jack Chen claims that Osman was attacked by Izhak Han, who had
driven him to Beidashan. Jack Chen, Sinkiang Story (London: Collier Macmillan, 1977), p. 261.
88.FRUS, 1947, p. 559.
89.Ibid., p. 565.
90.Ibid., p. 561.
91.Ibid., p. 566, citing a Xinhua news agency report of June 17, 1947, in turn citing
TASS, which broadcast an announcement on Beidashan made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the MPR, June 15, 1947.
92.American Foreign Service officer John Melby wrote in his diary in June 1947 on the "Mongol invasion of Sinkiang": "The Ministry of Information admitted to me that the hoopla is designed to help force a loan from us and to distract attention from
the disasters in Manchuria which are real disasters. The gentleman in question did not even smile when he said it." John Melby, The Mandate of Heaven (London: Chatto and Windus, 1969), p. 210.
Как Вам?
